Early Success in Southeast Asia Will Run through the Philippines

Commentary by Gregory B. Poling

Published September 26, 2024

This commentary is part of a report from the CSIS Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department entitled The Global Impact of the 2024 U.S. Presidential Election. The report features a set of essays assessing the meaning of the election for Europe, Russia, Eurasia, the Indo-Pacific, the Americas, Africa, and the Middle East.

Southeast Asia is at the forefront of U.S.-China strategic competition and is increasingly vital to U.S. economic goals. As companies diversify supply chains from China, the Vietnamese economy has led the way in attracting new investment, while other Southeast Asian countries-especially Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand-are working to grow their piece of the pie. Each will play a vital role in at least some of the industries on which the next U.S. administration will focus-Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam in critical minerals; Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam in semiconductor manufacturing; Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam in battery and electric vehicle production; and every one of these countries in various parts of the digital economy, including undersea cable landings and AI deployment.

Alongside that economic heft, Southeast Asia will play a crucial role in the normative competition between Washington and Beijing. As the most rapidly growing part of the nonaligned world, or Global South, and the one most intimately familiar with China, Southeast Asia will have an outsized influence on debates over rules, norms, and institutions. It is hard to envision China or the West winning any debate over the future of the rules-based order without carrying a majority of Southeast Asian votes. As a result, expect a President Harris or a President Trump to focus early and often on outreach to the region's major players, especially Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam.

Getting U.S. policy toward the Philippines right in the first 100 days will have singular importance in the region, as it did early in the Biden administration. In 2021, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin visited Manila during his first trip to Asia, prioritizing getting the U.S.-Philippines alliance back on track. At that time, the alliance remained brittle and struggled to push back against China's aggression in the South China Sea. The turnaround since has been remarkable, and the alliance is at its strongest in at least five decades. But Beijing has retaliated with even more aggression, hoping to compel either Manila or Washington to buckle under the pressure.

The violence China has employed against the Philippines since late 2023 will compel the next U.S. administration to put the South China Sea at the top of its priorities in the region. In August, Chinese vessels rammed and severely damaged two Philippine Coast Guard ships; several weeks earlier, a People's Liberation Army fighter jet dropped flares into the path of a Philippine patrol plane, risking the lives of its crew; and in mid-June, Chinese forces attacked two Philippine Navy rigid-hull inflatable boats with axes and knives, injuring eight sailors, including one who lost his thumb. These are only the most recent incidents in a monthly pattern of aggression.

Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos Jr. said during his keynote speech at the 2024 Shangri-La Dialogue that should Chinese actions cause the death of a Filipino service member, "We would have certainly crossed the Rubicon." He indicated that the Philippines would call for U.S. intervention under Article IV of the two nations' Mutual Defense Treaty and that he expects Washington to make good on its treaty commitments. The United States has certainly put its credibility on the line: in 2019, then secretary of state Mike Pompeo flew to Manila and for the first time said publicly that the treaty applies to any attack on Filipinos in the South China Sea. After every violent incident since, U.S. officials have repeated that commitment. Vice President Harris did so when she became the most senior U.S. official to visit Palawan, the Philippine province on the front lines of the South China Sea. Trump never spoke publicly about the South China Sea, but his cabinet officials strengthened U.S. support-rhetorical and military-for the Philippines during the last two years of his administration.

The threat of U.S. intervention has so far prevented China from simply using military force against its weaker neighbor, and it probably helped convince Beijing to reach a limited provisional arrangement with Manila to allow resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal after the violent clash in June. But accidents happen, and China's use of "nonlethal" weapons and intentional risks of collision mean the world could at any moment learn that Chinese forces have crossed that Rubicon, killing Filipinos and risking direct U.S.-China conflict. More likely, such an incident would not lead immediately to war, as neither the Philippines nor the United States would seek to escalate disproportionately. But it likely would signal the start of a dangerous new cold war that both sides insist they wish to avoid.

Whether Harris or Trump occupies the White House in January 2025, the Philippines will expect the United States to reiterate its commitment to defend Filipino lives and rights in the South China Sea. Other U.S. allies and partners across the region will also be alert for any sign of weakness or transactionalism. Whatever their concerns about escalation risk in the South China Sea, they will want to know that the new administration will follow through on promises to allies and that the United States will not sell them out in pursuit of a bilateral deal with Beijing.

Policy Recommendations

The best way for the next administration to reassure allies and partners while deterring Beijing will be to continue the generational modernization of the U.S.-Philippines alliance underway since 2021. To that end, the new administration in its first 100 days should focus on the following:

1. Conclude a general security of military information agreement if it remains unfinished in January 2025.
2. Pledge to seek congressional funding for Philippine military modernization under the recently concluded Security Sector Assistance Roadmap at or near the $500 million level of foreign military financing provided in fiscal year 2024.
3. Seek a trilateral national security advisers meeting or a trilateral cabinet-level meeting with Japan and the Philippines-as occurred for the first time in 2024-to advance coordination on joint training, military capacity building, and economic support, including through the Luzon Economic Corridor.

Gregory B. Poling is senior fellow and director of the Southeast Asia Program and Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

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