Syria: Iran and Hezbollah’s Savior and Achilles’ Heel

Commentary by Natasha Hall

Published October 16, 2024

As the Netanyahu government engages in wars throughout the Middle East to degrade Iran and its allied militias, Biden administration officials are reportedly calling these military victories a "history-defining moment." But is this moment history-defining in the way that White House officials seem to hope it is? Without a political solution that accommodates the millions yearning for peace and justice in the Middle East including Palestinians, Lebanese, and Syrians, it's likely not. Israel's tactical victories and Iran's losses will be ephemeral.

Regardless of how hard Israel pummels its adversaries in the Middle East, both Iran and Hezbollah have hundreds of miles of territory sweeping from the Mediterranean to Iran to recuperate in. Hezbollah and Iran also play the long game when others, like the United States, are too impatient. This tenacity has allowed them to entrench their control in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and, of course, Lebanon. Though Iran and Hezbollah are beaten down now, they have proven to be resilient in the face of tactical losses by being able to maneuver in conflict-affected and fragile states, where others have given up.

Syria is a case in point. Hezbollah and Iran's interventions in Syria since the start of the civil war have proven to be an advantage and disadvantage at certain moments. For example, recent reporting has suggested that their intervention in Syria has made them vulnerable to U.S. and Israeli intelligence gathering and targeting. However, this is not the first time Hezbollah and Iran have suffered due to their role in the war but stayed the course for longer-term strategic resilience.

In 2010, the Iranian-backed "axis of resistance"-with Hezbollah at the center-seemed both powerful and righteous. Hezbollah had the goodwill of the Arab world as a non-state armed group that forced the mighty Israel to withdraw its forces from Lebanon after an 18-year occupation. The war in Syria changed that image. From peaceful protests that demanded reform in 2011, Syria spiraled into a bloody conflict that became a playground for regional and international actors until the present day. Among those actors were Russia, Iran, and Iran's proxy, Hezbollah.

By helping to prop up the Bashar al-Assad regime through brute force, Hezbollah and Iran showed that resisting injustice in the region was a secondary task. The principal goal was building power. Hezbollah drafted thousands of fighters to besiege and attack densely populated areas in Syria. In doing so, their image was tarnished. They were no longer confronting "the Zionist enemy," their stated objective. Instead, they were killing fellow Muslims who were demanding freedom from an autocratic regime.

Despite those ideological losses, Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iran's elite units that carry out the Islamic Republic's ambitious military and political agenda outside the country, stayed the course. Their intervention was so critical to Assad's survival that Syrians discussed whether the regime had promised Hezbollah control of areas in western Syria like Madaya, where Hezbollah forces helped to besiege and starve civilians. Iran has also been informally expanding control of areas in the east and around Damascus.

Because Syria has been so distant from the interests of the international community in recent years, Hezbollah and Iran have been able to do as they please. A desperate Syrian regime was beholden to Iran's interests, allowing the Islamic Republic to further spread its influence, despite occasional Israeli attacks on assets in Syria. Even those who fought the regime and Iran-backed supporters like Hezbollah were forced to acquiesce. In places like Daraa, which rebel groups had controlled before pro-regime forces retook the province in 2018, Hezbollah has been able to recruit members in desperate communities.

But desperation in conflict also breeds malcontent and corruption. With Hezbollah and Iran's expanding influence came increased risks. As a Financial Times piece recently reported, Hezbollah began working and sharing intelligence with far more people than it had in the past. This exposed them to Israeli and U.S. intelligence gathering, which may have, in part, led to their tremendous losses in recent weeks. In just a month, Hezbollah has lost its spiritual, political, and military leader, Hassan Nasrallah, numerous deputies, and thousands of rank and file. Most importantly, it has lost its mystique as an effective bulwark against Israel. Iran has also been humiliated by Israeli attacks in the heart of an IRGC compound, assassinations of IRGC commanders, and attacks on Iranian diplomats. On September 8, both actors lost a secret weapons manufacturing facility deep underground in Syria in an Israeli commando raid.

The White House believes that these events could pave the way for a new future for Lebanon-or a "new order," as Israel called the operation to assassinate Hassan Nasrallah. But if the United States does not have a real plan for a new order that comprehensively addresses all the festering wounds in the region, Syria and other protracted conflicts will once again become an advantage for Iran and Hezbollah. They will recuperate and reassert themselves when the time is right, and they do not have to confront a militarily superior Israel or United States on their own terms.

Unresolved desperation in the region's protracted conflicts could breed malcontent and corruption that work against the United States next time. From Lebanon to Iran, militants have infinite hiding places and hundreds of miles of underground tunnels to transport supplies and personnel. And with Israel's brutal operations in Gaza, the West Bank, and now Lebanon, there will be an infinite number of future recruits from the region and beyond.

Rather than confront this political reality, the "day after" for Syria, Gaza and, now Lebanon, has become a quaint notion that conflicts end through reconstruction or technocratic fixes. They typically do not. Recent history in the region shows that without an acceptable political "day after," there will just be peaks and troughs of endless violence. This will have ramifications for Israel for the foreseeable future and no amount of bombing on Lebanon or elsewhere will likely change that. In fact, the consequences of Israeli military campaigns will create new openings for Iran and Hezbollah in places like Syria long after the United States wants to move on-just as it had before October 7.

Any future U.S. administration needs to be honest about its own appetite for or interest in war in the Middle East. While its ally, Israel, may be voracious, the United States is not for good reason. Because when the smoke clears, Netanyahu may survive another day, but U.S. credibility and security will be shattered with no discernable long-term gains and no plan to deal with a fiercer axis of resistance emerging from the ashes. If Israel is not amenable to peace, the United States will need to use its leverage to force a truce. In this war, such a strategy would play to U.S. strengths and interests. Dealing with protracted conflicts in a deprioritized region does not.

Natasha Hall is a senior fellow with the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Programs & Projects