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10/31/2024 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 10/31/2024 09:26

Is Space the New Wild West: The Need for Strengthened Space Traffic Management

Is Space the New Wild West: The Need for Strengthened Space Traffic Management

Photo: NASA/Tracy Dyson

Commentary by Sean O'KeefeandMakena Young

Published October 31, 2024

This series-featuring scholars from the Aerospace Security Project, non-resident experts, and the broader space community-explores key space trends, challenges, and policy issues that will confront the next administration as well as offers recommendations for how to navigate them.

In February 2024, a 35-year-old Russian spy satellite and a 25-year-old NASA scientific satellite came alarmingly close to collision, missing each other by just 33 feet-the length of a school bus. This close call, which could have resulted in thousands of pieces of debris and posed significant risks to all satellites in orbit, is yet another example that underscores the urgent need for effective space traffic management (STM) of all global assets orbiting the Earth. It is in the United States' national interest to take the lead in establishing safe and effective STM tools as well as operational protocols to be used by satellite operators around the globe. But at present, a U.S. national system to manage its domestic capacities has not been fully integrated, and controlling authorities are ambiguous. In short, the United States is not in a strong position to manage its own activities, much less global operations.

There are currently 46,600 objects tracked in orbit, over 10,500 of which are active satellites and spacecraft transporting humans. Of the number of operational spacecraft, about 80 percent operate in low Earth orbit (LEO)-that region of space within 100-1,200 miles above the surface of the Earth. The consequences are already evident: as the largest satellite operator, SpaceX has reported that in a six-month period in early 2024, on average, each satellite in its Starlink constellation maneuvered 14 times to avoid collision for a total of 50,000 maneuvers in six months. Further, astronauts on the International Space Station have had to shelter in place, postpone spacewalks, and maneuver the station multiple times in a three-week span due to debris. Disputes have arisen over close approaches involving OneWeb and Starlink, and China has filed a note verbale with the United Nations concerning Starlink satellites nearing its space station.

These incidents have become far more frequent. Five years ago, the number of space assets orbiting the Earth was less than a third of what they are today. With the steady increase in satellite launches and large commercial communications and imagery constellations projected to at least double within the decade ahead, space is clearly becoming more crowded. The good news is that it's easier to launch and less expensive to operate satellites in space today. But as odd as it may sound, "space" is not unlimited. It's difficult to put an estimate on the increased number of satellites in orbit that would exceed the capacity of space to accommodate safe operations. However, it is a fair assumption that the risk of safely operating more satellites has exponentially increased. And with that, the increased risk is a looming liability that is unquantifiable.

Currently, there are no internationally agreed-to rules of the road for STM or coordination. Space operations will continue to grow more complex as the space domain becomes increasingly diverse. In the earlier chapters of space exploration, two superpowers dominated the space domain. Today, ten nations have domestic launch capabilities, more are rapidly developing launch capacity, and nearly 100 nations operate or use satellite data from spacecraft that are owned by national enterprises. Norms and protocols of operations in the domain will be essential to maintaining a sustainable environment, and the United States should be engaged in establishing rules of the road. To explore potential pathways for international STM, it may be useful to draw parallels with established norms in the maritime and aviation domains. The UN Law of the Sea Convention and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) provide well-established international governance structures that operators in the space domain may be able to draw from.

Centuries in the making, the Law of the Sea Convention established rules of the road for operators in the world's oceans and maritime activities to include navigation, resource management, and environmental protection. Similarly, the ICAO provides a comprehensive framework for the safe growth of international civil aviation. One of its primary achievements is the establishment of a shared airspace management system, which includes air traffic control, flight planning, and data exchange protocols. An analogous framework for space could foster collaborative coordination in space, drawing lessons from the collaboration and standardization for satellite operations, collision avoidance protocols, and data-sharing mechanisms. By promoting international cooperation, the United States could help mitigate the risks associated with space debris and potentially overcrowded orbits.

The road to formal adoption of global rules for maritime and aviation has been neither short nor paved smoothly. Both frameworks began with coalitions of nations looking for coordination in their domains-though this did not include all global players or even the dominant actors. The United States still has not ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, although its national and commercial maritime assets have adopted the operational protocols. Similarly, it took both the Soviet Union and China nearly 25 years to recognize ICAO.

A starting point for space may be the Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space, established by the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs and supported by a coalition of nations. Safety of space operations is one of four pillars in the document, which asks states to provide updated contact information, improve the accuracy and sharing of orbital data, provide space debris monitoring information, and perform conjunction assessment during flight. The United States should lead these discussions and be an open partner with nations and coalitions with similar STM goals. This includes the European Union, which maintains the European Union Space Surveillance and Tracking program, and the United Kingdom, which has released an "Astra Carta" initiative to encourage the private sector to coordinate space activities with an eye for sustainability, and Japan, an engaged partner in STM activities. The United States must also continue to open lines of communication with China. As the nation that launches the second highest number of satellites behind the United States, coordination in the increasingly crowded domain will be unavoidable between the two nations.

However, the United States will not be seen as a leader in this arena without a fully functioning STM program of its own. The Department of Defense (DOD) has long maintained a catalog of all objects in space and provided free global space situational awareness (SSA) data to satellite operators through SpaceTrack.org. In June 2018, Space Policy Directive-3, National Space Traffic Management Policy, ordered a change in who maintains the space catalog, shifting responsibility of this mission from DOD to a civil agency successor, the Department of Commerce. After six years, the Office of Space Commerce (OSC) launched the Traffic Coordination System for Space (TraCSS). When fully operational, TraCSS will provide SSA data in all Earth orbits and will contract with commercial SSA companies to complement government data. The beta system launched in September 2024 will monitor an initial 1,000 objects six times a day. This information will be distributed to 10 commercial companies through SpaceTrack.org.

While this development is promising, this first step took a considerable amount of time to implement-the same amount of time as the three-fold increase in space traffic. OSC leadership has indicated that the transition of data from DOD may take an additional five years. Further, in a July 2024 audit, inspectors found that "Efforts to Provide Space Situational Awareness Services Have Been Delayed and Need a Realistic Schedule," suggesting that getting TraCSS up and running may take even longer. Though the OSC budget has continually increased over the past two years to support operations, auditors suggested OSC does not have a long-term goal to develop guidelines or norms of behavior for satellite operators once they receive TraCSS data. This disjointed and delayed operation shows that even developing a more robust and reliable STM capability is not a serious priority for the United States.

As space becomes increasingly congested, the need for effective STM is more critical than ever. TraCSS alone will not prevent collisions, operators will need to develop their own protocols to use the data provided if they are capable of maneuvering, but it is a necessary first step. As TraCSS crawls to an operational state, the United States risks lagging behind in a rapidly evolving environment that demands swift action. A robust domestic coordination system is imperative if the United States is to lead in the international effort to develop responsible norms for behavior in space. The current rate of progress is unacceptable. The time to act is now-the shared future in space depends on it.

Sean O'Keefe is a distinguished senior adviser (non-resident) in the Office of the President at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Makena Young is a fellow with the Aerospace Security Project at CSIS.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2024 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

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Distinguished Senior Adviser (Non-resident), Office of the President
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Fellow, Aerospace Security Project